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MOVING BEYOND THE CLAMOR FOR "HEDGE FUND
REGULATION": A RECONSIDERATION OF "CLIENT" UNDER
THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940
ANITA K KRUG*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the Advisers Act)I regulates in-vestment advisers and requires some investment advisers to become
registered with the SEC. Registered investment advisers must comply with
the substantive provisions of the Advisers Act.2 The Advisers Act, like its
companion statute, the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the Investment
Company Act),3 was a final component of the post-Depression overhaul of
the securities regulatory system and a product of the heightened and
broadened interest among the public in investing in public securities.4 In
the eyes of Congress, the public's expanding investment activities pro-
vided opportunities for people who advised investors on securities to en-
gage in activities that were not in the investors' best interests-whether
because the advisers' advice was less than objective or because the advisers
were merely "tipsters" seeking to promote interest in certain securities for
their own personal benefit.
For those in the then-nascent investment advisory industry, the Advis-
ers Act was perceived as an incursion of federal power into the "close per-
sonal and confidential relationship between the investment-counsel firm
and its client."5 In the wake of the recent upheaval in the financial mar-
kets and the perception that hedge funds helped cause it, however, the
* Until Spring 2010, Research Fellow, Berkeley Center for Law, Business and
the Economy, University of California, Berkeley School of Law and, beginning
Summer 2010, Assistant Professor, University of Washington School of Law. The
author thanks George W. Dent, Jr., Victor Fleischer, Joan MacLeod Heminway,
Kevin A. Kordana, Arthur B. Laby, Evan Lee, Rory Little, Colleen E. Medill,
Amanda M. Rose, Jonathan Rose, and Darien Shanske for their comments on
earlier drafts of this Article. This Article does not reflect developments or events
after April 2010.
1. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2006).
2. Under the Advisers Act, an "investment adviser" is someone who "for com-
pensation, engages in the business of advising others . . . as to the advisability of
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities." Id. § 80b-2(a) (11).
3. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64.
4. See SEC, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES: INVESTMENT
COUNSEL, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, INVESTMENT SUPERVISORY, AND INVESTMENT
ADVISORY SERVICES, H.R. Doc. No. 76-477, at 5 (2d Sess. 1939) [hereinafter SEC
REPORT].
5. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong. 713 (1940) [hereinafter Senate Hear-
ings] (statement of Charles M. O'Hearn, Vice President & Director, Clarke, Sin-
sabaugh & Co., Investment Counsel) (speaking against S. 3580, a "bill proposed
(661)
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
1940 description of investment advisers betrays a transformation of the
investment advisory industry, from one in which clients engaged advisers
to counsel them on their overall investment needs to one in which hedge
fund investors are drawn to hedge fund managers' proprietary strategies.
Emblematic of that evolution, prevailing doctrine and jurisprudence
do not, in many respects, countenance that investment advisers may aggre-
gate assets into hedge funds, private equity funds, and other private funds
and manage those funds, rather than manage numerous separate client
accounts. 6 Moreover, to the extent prevailing doctrine contemplates
those aggregated arrangements, it regards the fund itself, rather than its
investors, as the "client" of the adviser, in a nod to the formality that the
fund (as opposed to its investors) is the direct recipient of the investment
advice provided by the fund's investment adviser.7
By denying client status to hedge fund (and other private fund) inves-
tors, the current doctrine has had the effect of under-regulating invest-
ment advisers that manage private funds, particularly because those
advisers do not owe fund investors the fiduciary duties that they owe to
their "clients"-the funds themselves. In addition, and counterintuitively,
that doctrine arguably impedes efficiency in asset allocation and, ulti-
mately, capital formation. Both effects are potentially significant, consid-
ering the billions of dollars invested in private funds managed by U.S.
investment advisers and heightened investor worries in the aftermath of
the Madoff fraud and other high-profile fraud cases. Beyond those effects,
the current doctrine gives rise to theoretical and practical anomalies and
creates uncertainties for both investors and investment advisers. Further,
although Congress may be expected to eliminate the exemption from Ad-
visers Act registration on which many investment advisers to private funds
for the regulation of the investment-counsel profession," because, among other
things, it was "against public interest").
6. That oversight is due, at least in part, to the circumstance that, in the early
years of the investment advisory industry, investment advisers' clients tended to be
individuals who directly engaged the advisers for their services. See SEC REPORT,
supra note 4, at 8-9 (noting that SEC's 1936 survey of investment advisory firms
showed that "individual or personal accounts represented about 83% of all the
accounts administered" by responding advisers); see also Senate Hearings, supra note
5, at 723 (statement of Dwight Rose, President, Investment Counsel Association of
America) (explaining that "sole function" of firms with ICAA membership was "to
render to clients, on a personal basis, competent, unbiased, and continuous advice
regarding the sound management of their investments"); id. at 715 (statement of
Charles M. O'Hearn, Vice President & Director, Clarke, Sinsabaugh & Co., Invest-
ment Counsel) (noting that his firm's clients were "men and women of means who
are very critical in their examination of our performance" and who, "[i]f they dis-
approve[d] of our activities," would "cancel their contracts with us").
7. See, e.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (concluding
that hedge fund investors are not appropriately deemed "clients" under Advisers
Act in part because "[an investor in a private fund may benefit from the adviser's
advice (or he may suffer from it) but he does not receive the advice directly"); see
also infra notes 30-52 and accompanying text (discussing cases explaining nature of
investment advisers' relationships to their clients).
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(or "hedge fund managers," as they are often called in the hedge fund
context) rely,8 that change, as presently contemplated, would not ade-
quately ameliorate these concerns and perhaps would even delay the day
when regulators address them.
This Article argues that, from both theoretical and pragmatic per-
spectives, a better approach would be for law to regard private fund inves-
tors as clients of the managers of those funds for all purposes under the
investment advisory regulatory regime. In making these arguments, it dis-
sects the doctrinal and historical underpinnings and sources of the cur-
rent doctrine-legislative history and case law, in particular, but also SEC
interpretations and rule changes. In light of the policy considerations-
including investor protection-that gave rise to the Advisers Act, the
growth of the investment advisory industry and private funds' role in it,
and lessons learned from recent turmoil in the financial markets, a doc-
trine that regards private fund investors as the clients of the funds' manag-
ers is more coherent and better policy.
Part II discusses the current regulatory regime governing investment
advisers, including the exemption from investment adviser registration
that many large fund managers have relied on to avoid SEC regulation,
which considers each fund a single client. Reviewing prominent cases on
investment adviser regulation and obligations, Part II also traces the ori-
gins of the doctrine that the person who is the direct recipient of an invest-
ment adviser's services is to be regarded as the client of that adviser-
which, in turn, has been employed to support the doctrine that a fund
(rather than its investors) is the adviser's client. Part III surveys some of
the implications and incongruities arising from that doctrine, including
the effective under-regulation of large investment advisers and augmenta-
tion of agency costs and other inefficiencies. It also discusses how recent
and likely legislative changes are unlikely to remedy those deficiencies.
Part IV discusses the misunderstanding of the adviser-client relationship
and the misinterpretation of precedent evident in recent, prominent cases
supporting the current doctrine. It further shows that current doctrine is
contrary to-or at least gains no support from-the legislative history of
the Advisers Act. Part V focuses on an alternative doctrine, one in which
fund investors are deemed clients for purposes of investment advisers' reg-
ulatory obligations. That Part posits both that this alternative doctrine al-
leviates incongruities in current regulation and that it is consistent with
fiduciary principles.
II. THE FUND-CLIENT DOCTRINE
Investment advisers may advise individuals and institutions-such as
pension plans, foundations, and endowments-separately from one an-
other. In these so-called "separate account" arrangements, an individual
or institution generally places assets in an account held by a custodian of
8. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b) (3)-1(a) (2) (i) (2009).
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that individual's or institution's choosing and gives investment authority to
the investment adviser that will manage those assets, effectively handing to
the adviser the "keys to the car" for investment purposes only. The terms
and conditions of the advisory relationship are generally contained within
an investment advisory agreement to which only the individual or entity
and the adviser are parties.
Alternatively, investment advisers may manage capital on an aggre-
gated basis. In those circumstances, individuals and entities "pool" their
assets in a single investment vehicle, such as a partnership or an offshore
company. The investment adviser then enters into an investment advisory
agreement with the pooled investment vehicle-known as a "fund" in
common parlance-rather than with any of its investors (or, if also serving
as the fund's general partner or managing member, enters into a partner-
ship or LLC agreement with all of the investors).
Some of those funds, including so-called "mutual" funds, are "public,"
in the sense that they become registered as investment companies under
the Investment Company Act and, by virtue of doing so, may offer their
interests publicly and become obligated to comply with the full range of
substantive regulations set forth in that Act. Other funds, such as so-called
"hedge" funds and private equity funds, are "private," meaning that they
rely on exemptions from having to register as "investment companies"
under the Investment Company Act. Or, more precisely, these funds com-
ply with one of the exclusions from the definition of "investment com-
pany" set forth in Sections 3(c) (1) through 3(c) (7) of the Investment
Company Act.9 In the case of both private funds and registered invest-
ment companies, under relevant statutes, regulations, and case law, the
fund itself, rather than its investors, is deemed the client of the investment
adviser that manages the fund.
A. The Advisers Act and SEC Regulation
The Advisers Act embodies the principle that the fund is its adviser's
client. That principle-the "fund-client doctrine," for the sake of expedi-
ency-can be seen most readily in one of the Advisers Act's exemptions
permitting certain investment advisers to remain unregistered, regardless
of how much capital the advisers manage. In particular, pursuant to the
so-called "private adviser exemption" of Section 203(b) (3) of the Advisers
Act, an investment adviser that has fewer than fifteen "clients" and does
not hold itself out publicly as an investment adviser does not need to be-
come registered with the SEC as an investment adviser.10 Section 203 fur-
ther provides that, for purposes of determining whether an adviser has
fewer than fifteen clients, corporations, limited partnerships, LLCs, trusts,
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c) (1)-(7) (2006) (listing securities issuers that are ex-
cluded from definition of "investment company" under Investment Company Act).
10. See 17 C.F.R. § 2 75.203(b) (3)-1(a) (2) (i).
664 [Vol. 55: p. 661
2010]RECONSIDERATION OF "CLIENT" UNDER THE ADVISERs AcT 665
and other organizations to which an adviser provides advice-such as in-
vestment funds-are the "clients" of the adviser that advises them."1
The fund-client doctrine was not always settled doctrine, however.
Prior to 1980, the Advisers Act, either in Section 203(b) (3) or otherwise,
did not specify whether corporations, limited partnerships, LLCs, trusts,
and other entities that an adviser managed could be considered the ad-
viser's clients, or whether the adviser needed to view the investors in those
entities as its clients.' 2 A 1977 decision of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit could have proposed an answer but did not.
In particular, in Abrahamson v. fleschner,'3 the Second Circuit held, among
other things, that general partners to investment partnerships who, in that
role, provided investment advice to the partnerships, were "investment ad-
visers" under the Advisers Act. In the original draft of the court's opinion,
the court stated that those general partners were investment advisers "to
the limited partners" of the partnerships.' 4 Those four words were not
included in the final published opinion, however. That the opinion did
not commit itself to either interpretation of "client" meant that the ques-
tion would persist and, given the two versions of the opinion, arguably
become more pointed.
In 1980, however, Congress amended Section 203(b) (3) to add this
guidance:
11. See id. To be sure, that exemption is controversial, a target of the lack of
regulatory oversight of hedge fund managers that observers and policymakers
widely perceived in the aftermath of the market turmoil that began in 2008. Ac-
cordingly, throughout 2009 and into 2010, members of Congress and the Obama
Administration have proposed various amendments to the Advisers Act that would
eliminate the private adviser exemption, at least for U.S.-based investment advisers
and certain non-U.S. investment advisers. See, e.g., Private Fund Investment Advis-
ers Registration Act of 2010 (proposed by Sen. Christopher Dodd (D-CT) in March
2010 as part of a comprehensive financial regulatory reform proposal, the Restor-
ing American Financial Stability Act of 2010, 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter Sen-
ate Bill]); Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009, H.R. 3818,
111th Cong. (2009) (based on the Obama Administration's July 2009 proposal on
financial regulatory reform and proposed by Representative Paul Kanjorski (D-PA)
in October 2009); Private Fund Transparency Act of 2009, S. 1276, 111th Cong.
(2009) (proposed by Sen. Jack Reed (D-RI) in June 2009); Hedge Fund Adviser
Registration Act of 2009, H.R. 711, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposed by Representa-
tives Michael Castle (R-DE) and Michael Capuano (D-MA) in January 2009). An
amended version of Representative Kanjorski's bill was included in the financial
regulatory reform legislation that the House of Representatives passed in Decem-
ber 2009. See Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R.
4173, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter House Bill]. As discussed in Part III, the
elimination of the private adviser exemption would not, without more, discredit
the doctrine that a hedge fund manager's client is the fund rather than the fund's
investors. See infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
12. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 878-79.
13. 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977).
14. See Robert C. Hacker & Ronald D. Rotunda, SEC Registration of Private In-
vestment Partnerships After Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1471, 1484
n.72 (1978).
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For purposes of determining the number of clients of an invest-
ment adviser under [the private adviser exemption], no share-
holder, partner, or beneficial owner of a business development
company . . . shall be deemed to be a client of such investment
adviser unless such person is a client of such investment adviser
separate and apart from his status as a shareholder, partner, or
beneficial owner.15
The legislative history suggests that the amendment's failure to refer to
entities other than business development companies was to have no impli-
cations as to whether other types of entities may also warrant the same
treatment. Specifically:
[W] ith respect to persons or firms which do not advise business
development companies, the second amendment to Section
203(b) (3) (the attribution of client status to a shareholder, part-
ner or beneficial owner) is not intended to suggest that each
shareholder, partner or beneficial owner of a company advised
by such a person or firm should or should not be regarded as a
client of that person or firm.1 6
That nothing should be read into the fact that the amendment by its terms
applied only to advisers of business development companies is supported
by the fact that the amendment was part of a legislative package intended
to help business enterprises, "particularly small growing and financially
troubled enterprises, . . . more readily raise needed capital."1 7
The SEC finally resolved this ambiguity in 1985, adopting Rule
203(b) (3)-1 under the Advisers Act, which specified that an adviser to a
limited partnership may count the partnership, rather than each of its
partners, as a client for purposes of the private adviser exemption.' 8 Con-
15. Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477,§ 202, 94 Stat. 2275, 2290 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (3)(2006)).
16. H.R. REP. No. 96-1341, at 38 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4800,4844.
17. Id. at 1. In highlighting that Congress appeared to contemplate that "in-
vestment companies," as opposed to the investors in those companies, were appro-priately considered clients of their advisers, the Court in Goldstein pointed to,
among other things, Congress's 1970 amendment to Section 203(b) (3), which pro-
vided that investment advisers to registered investment companies could not rely
on the private adviser exemption. The Court reasoned that the "prohibition
would have been unnecessary if the shareholders of investment companies couldbe counted as 'clients.'" Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 879. For further discussion of theGoldstein case, see infra notes 107-22. This argument ignores that Congress couldhave adopted the prohibition in full recognition of the ambiguity relating to the
meaning of "client." That is, in seeking to require any adviser that advises a regis-tered investment company to become registered as an investment adviser underthe Advisers Act, Congress may have wanted to close any possible loopholes or to
avoid interpretive questions rather than to propound any view of whether investorsin registered investment companies were or were not to be deemed clients.
18. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b) (3)-1(a) (2) (i) (2009).
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versely, the rule also specified that a limited partner would not be counted
as a client of the partnership's general partner (or other adviser to the
partnership) if the partnership's interests were "securities" (a condition
that is usually met), the advice the adviser provided to the partnership was
"based on the investment objectives of the limited partners as a group," 19
and the adviser was not the "alter ego" of a registered investment ad-
viser.20 Rule 203(b) (3)-1, then, expressly made the private adviser exemp-
tion available, without question, to advisers to investment limited
partnerships, so long as those partnerships were not registered under the
Investment Company Act.
The SEC grounded the rule on the notion that an investment adviser
to an investment fund manages the fund based on the investment objec-
tives of fund investors as a group, rather than on their respective individ-
ual investment objectives. 2 ' Implicitly recognizing that, notwithstanding
the partnership's being the subject of the investment advice provided by
its general partner or other adviser, the partnership's assets comprised
that of its limited partners, the SEC nodded-in a three-sentence foot-
note-to what protections might be available to limited partners given
that under the rule limited partners, to the extent that they met the rule's
conditions, would not be afforded the protections afforded to investment
advisory clients. 22 "Additional protections," the release notes, "will be pro-
vided by general partnership law," which, for example, might specify cer-
tain fiduciary duties that a general partner might have to the partnership's
limited partners.23 In addition, "under general partnership law, a general
partner is liable for partnership debts."24
Of course, by its terms, the rule pertained specifically to investment
limited partnerships. That attention to partnerships may have been a
product of the historical view of partnerships and corporations. Partner-
ships traditionally-and, perhaps, by definition-have been viewed as ag-
19. Definition of "Client" of Investment Adviser for Certain Purposes Relating
to Limited Partnerships, 50 Fed. Reg. 8740, 8740 (Mar. 5, 1985) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 275) [hereinafter 1985 Release]. The SEC further noted that this
requirement "would prevent a general partner, in contravention of [S]ection
208(d) of the Advisers Act, from using the partnership to do what it could not do
directly itself, namely, provide individualized investment advice to 15 or more cli-
ents without registering as an investment adviser." Id. at 8741.
20. Id. at 8740-41. The rule also provided that the possibility of meeting those
three conditions would not be available as to a limited partner that, "separate and
apart from his status as a limited partner," was an "investment advisory client" of
the partnership's adviser or a "related person" of the adviser. Id. at 8742. Accord-
ingly, an adviser had to deem a limited partner a client, notwithstanding Rule
203(b) (3)-1, if the adviser provided the limited partner investment advise to trans-
fer the partner's assets among limited partnerships or other investment advisory
services.
21. Id. at 8741.
22. See id. at 8741 n.17.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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gregates of individuals, rather than as separate and distinct legal
personalities traditionally deemed characteristic of corporations. 25 That
view may have been the basis for the SEC's pronouncement in a 1976 "no-
action" letter that if an investment partnership had been organized by its
general partner or other adviser, "the members of such partnership would
probably each be counted in determining how many clients the adviser
was serving."2 6 The message was that the SEC could, if it wished, view a
partnership, like a corporation, as a distinct legal entity. But because a
partnership was also, quite literally, a group of partners, it would be rea-
sonable to take a different view if the need arose.2 7
More importantly, the release suggests that the SEC intended the
principle it was announcing to extend to investment pools organized as
corporations and possibly other types of entities-or, more precisely, that
it already applied to those other entities. It appears that the SEC deemed
the question of who counts as a client as it pertained to those other entity
structures not to be in question: in setting out its rationale for regarding a
partnership as its adviser's client, the SEC noted that "[a]n investment
company organized as a corporation, rather than each of its stockholders,
is generally regarded as the client of the company's investment adviser."28
In any event, with the 1985 release settling the question of whether a fund
was its adviser's client, fund advisers had the confirmation they needed
both to rely on an exemption from registration as investment advisers
under the Advisers Act and to direct their fiduciary obligations to the fund
rather than to the fund's investors.2 9
25. See Orro VON GIERKE, COMMUNITY IN HISTOICAL PERSPECTIVE 198-208(Antony Black ed., Mary Fischer trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1990) (1868); Orro
VON GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY 1500 TO 1800, at 45-46(Ernest Barker trans., Beacon Press 1957) (1913). Under modern doctrine, how-
ever, partnerships are generally regarded as entities that are separate and distinctfrom their partners. See, e.g., UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 201(a) (1997) ("A partnership is
an entity distinct from its partners.").
26. Ruth Levine, SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 WL 12210, at *2 (Dec. 15,1976).
27. Cf Hacker & Rotunda, supra note 14, at 1478.
This apparently conflicting position, which recognizes the hedge fund
partnership as a legal entity but regards each limited partner as a separate
client, reflects a long and unsettled debate as to whether the law should
view a partnership as an aggregate of legally distinct individuals or as a
single entity. In other contexts the law treats a partnership as an entity
for some purposes and an aggregate for others; the Commission staff ap-
pears to follow this functional approach.
Id.
28. 1985 Release, supra note 19, at 8741.
29. In 1997, the SEC extended Rule 203(b) (3)-1 to encompass legal entities
other than partnerships. See Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1633, 62 Fed. Reg.
28,112 (May 22, 1997). In that year, the SEC also reaffirmed the analysis in which
it grounded Rule 203(b) (3)-1, noting that a "client of an investment adviser typi-
cally is provided with individualized advice that is based on the client's financial
situation and investment objectives" and that, "[i]n contrast, the investment ad-
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B. Case Law and the Fund-Client Doctrine
At virtually the same time that the SEC proposed amending the Advis-
ers Act rule to include its interpretation of "client" for purposes of Section
203(b) (3) of the Advisers Act, the Supreme Court, in Lowe v. SEC,30 ap-
peared to support the logic behind the rule: an investment adviser's client
achieves that status by virtue of directly receiving personalized advice from
the adviser. As elaborated further in Part IV, although the Lowe analysis
helped fuel the argument that the fund-client doctrine is the appropriate
framework for the fund-adviser relationship, any reliance on Lowe for that
purpose is misplaced.
Evaluating whether publishers of materials containing investment-re-
lated commentary were "investment advisers" as defined under the Advis-
ers Act, the Lowe Court emphasized that a defining characteristic of
investment advisers is their tailoring their advice to suit their clients'
needs: "The [Advisers] Act was designed to apply to those persons en-
gaged in the investment-advisory profession-those who provide personal-
ized advice attuned to a client's concerns . . . ."31 By contrast, the
petitioners' publications were impersonal-they were not tailored to the
particular investment needs and goals of the persons who read them-and
had not developed "into the kind of fiduciary, person-to-person relation-
ships that were discussed at length in the legislative history of the [Advis-
ers] Act and that are characteristic of investment adviser-client
relationships."3 2 Accordingly, the Court believed that the petitioners
could not be considered investment advisers and thus were not required
to become registered as such under the Advisers Act.33
Lowe's emphasis on personalized and direct advice as a defining char-
acteristic of an investment advisory relationship derived in part from both
the legislative history of the Advisers Act and SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc.,3 4 a 1963 Supreme Court case that articulated the fiduciary
nature of investment advisers' relationships to their advisory clients. At
issue in Capital Gains Research Bureau was whether an investment adviser,
Capital Gains Research Bureau (CGRB), that profited off of its investment
recommendations to clients by trading in recommended securities was ob-
ligated to disclose to clients that it was doing so, in light of the conflicting
viser of an investment company need not consider the individual needs of the
company's shareholders when making investment decisions, and thus has no obli-
gation to ensure that each security purchased for the company's portfolio is an
appropriate investment for each shareholder." Status of Investment Advisory Pro-
grams Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, Investment Advisers Act Re-
lease No. 22,579, 62 Fed. Reg. 15,098, 15,102 (Mar. 31, 1997) [hereinafter 1997
Release].
30. 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
31. Id. at 207-08.
32. Id. at 210.
33. See id. at 211.
34. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
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interests it had in making its recommendations.35 At the basis of that
question was, in turn, the question of whether CGRB's trading practices
"operate[d] as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client
within the meaning of the [Advisers] Act."3 6
The SEC had sought an injunction pursuant to which CGRB would
need to disclose to clients its practices of trading in recommended securi-
ties.37 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York had
denied the SEC's request on the basis that the Advisers Act used the terms
"fraud" and "deceit" "in their technical sense" and that the SEC had not
shown "an intent to injure clients or an actual loss of money to clients."3 8
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the
district court's denial of injunctive relief in a five-to-four decision, ac-
cepting the district court's interpretation of the Advisers Act's antifraud
provision.3 9 However, the dissenting judges countered that the "common-
law" doctrines of fraud and deceit that the majority had embraced "grew
up in a business climate very different from that involved in the sale of
securities" and argued instead for a broader interpretation of those terms
as used in the Advisers Act.4 0
The Supreme Court determined to hear the case to settle the ques-
tion of whether Congress intended the Advisers Act's proscriptions on
"fraud" and "deceit" to be read narrowly and technically or whether they
should be given a "broad remedial construction" that would extend to an
adviser's failure to disclose material facts. 41 The Court sought guidance
from the history of the Advisers Act-"the last in a series of Acts designed
to eliminate certain abuses in the securities industry, abuses which were
35. See id. at 183. CGRB sent a monthly report to subscribers who paid an
annual subscription price. See id. From time to time, prior to recommending a
security in a report, CGRB would purchase the security. See id. After CGRB haddistributed the report, the price of the security would increase (presumably as a
consequence of subscribers' buying the security for their own accounts, based on
the report's recommendations), and CGRB would sell its holdings of the security
immediately thereafter, realizing a profit. See id.
36. Id. at 181 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
37. See id.
38. Id. at 184 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
39. See id. at 184-85. Summarizing the Second Circuit's analysis, the Court
noted that
[t] he majority concluded that no violation of the Act could be found ab-
sent proof that "any misstatements or false figures were contained in any
of the bulletins"; or that "the investment advice was unsound"; or that
"defendants were being bribed or paid to tout a stock contrary to their
own beliefs"; or that "these bulletins were a scheme to get rid of worthless
stock"; or that the recommendations were made "for the purpose of en-
deavoring artificially to raise the market so that [CGRB] might unload[its] holdings at a profit."
Id. at 185 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 600, 608-
09 (2d Cir. 1962)).
40. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
41. See id. at 185-86.
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found to have contributed to the stock market crash of 1929 and the de-
pression of the 1930s." 42 It observed that one purpose behind the Advis-
ers Act, as well as the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, "was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the phi-
losophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business
ethics in the securities industry."4 3 It also cited the SEC's 1935 report on
the activities of investment advisers and investment companies that
"culminated in the [A]dvisers Act," which:
reflects the attitude-shared by investment advisers and the
Commission-that investment advisers could not "completely
perform their basic function-furnishing to clients on a personal
basis competent, unbiased and continuous advice regarding the
sound management of their investments-unless all conflicts of
interest between the investment counsel and the client were
removed.44
The Court also looked to the Committee hearings on the Advisers Act,
during which various investment advisers had testified about the nature of
their businesses and beliefs that investment advisers should, in providing
their services, be influenced only by their clients' best interests. In the
Court's characterization, "the Committee Reports indicate a desire to pre-
serve 'the personalized character of the services of investment advisers,'
and to eliminate conflicts of interest between the investment adviser and
the clients." 45
From this, the Court concluded that the Advisers Act embodied "a
congressional recognition 'of the delicate fiduciary nature of an invest-
ment advisory relationship,' as well as a congressional intent to eliminate,
or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline an invest-
ment adviser-consciously or unconsciously-to render advice which was
not disinterested." 46 In light of investment advisers' status as fiduciaries,
the SEC need not "establish all the elements required in a suit against a
party to an arm's-length transaction."4 7 Rather, fiduciaries have an obliga-
tion to disclose all material facts to their clients and be careful to avoid
misleading them.4 8
42. Id. at 186.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 187 (citing SEC REPORT, supra note 4, at 28).
45. Id. at 191 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 76-2639, at 28 (3d Sess. 1940)).
46. Id. at 191-92 (quoting 2 Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1412 (2d ed.
1961)).
47. Id. at 194.
48. The Court noted that this interpretation of an adviser's duty is not incon-
sistent with common-law fraud doctrine, as the Second Circuit dissenting judges
had suggested:
There has ... been a growing recognition by common-law courts that the
doctrines of fraud and deceit which developed around transactions in-
volving land and other tangible items of wealth are ill-suited to the sale of
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEw
Congress, in empowering the courts to enjoin any practice which
operates "as a fraud or deceit" upon a client, did not intend to
require proof of intent to injure and actual injury to the client.
Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to be
construed like other securities legislation "enacted for the pur-
pose of avoiding frauds," not technically and restrictively, but
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.49
In the Court's view, an adviser's clients should be given the opportu-
nity "to evaluate such overlapping motivations, through appropriate dis-
closure, in deciding whether an adviser is serving 'two masters' or only
one, 'especially . .. if one of the masters happens to be economic self-
interest.' "50 Accordingly, the Court held that the Advisers Act "empowers
the courts ... to require an adviser to make full and frank disclosure of his
practice of trading on the effect of his recommendations." 5 1 Based on
that conclusion, it further concluded that CGRB, because it traded on "the
market effect of [its] own recommendation," may have an incentive to
recommend a particular security "because of its potential for short-run
price increase in response to anticipated activity from the recommenda-
tion" rather than because the security evinced "potential for long-run
price increase."52
Capital Gains Research Bureau, in its focus on the fiduciary role of advis-
ers and the importance of disclosure of conflicts, appears to presume and
embrace a notion of investment advisory services as services provided pur-
suant to a personalized and direct relationship between investment advis-
ers and their clients. As discussed below, however, that notion draws from
an analysis of the history of the Advisers Act that simply does not speak to
the propriety or impropriety of the principle that a fund, rather than its
investors, is the client of its investment adviser. Accordingly, despite the
importance of that case in establishing the nature and contour of invest-
ment advisers' fiduciary duties and disclosure obligations, it, like Lowe,
cannot inform an analysis of the fund-client doctrine.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FUND-CLIENT DOCTRINE
A. Inconsistent and Deficient Regulation of Investment Advisers
Lowe and Capital Gains Research Bureau provide the basis for the SEC's
conclusion that the client of an adviser to an investment fund is the fund
such intangibles as advice and securities, and that, accordingly, the doc-
trines must be adapted to the merchandise in issue.
Id.
49. Id. at 195 (quoting 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 382 (3d ed.
1943)).
50. Id. at 196 (quoting United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S.
520, 549 (1961)).
51. Id. at 197.
52. Id. at 196.
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itself, rather than any of the fund's investors: as between the fund and its
investors, it is the fund that is the direct recipient of "personalized" advi-
sory services from the adviser. That conclusion has important implications
for the adviser's compliance with its fiduciary obligations and, to the ex-
tent it is registered as an investment adviser, its obligations under the Ad-
visers Act. In particular, if the fund is the adviser's client, the fund is also
the subject of the adviser's fiduciary obligations and, as a corollary, the
party to which the adviser is required to disclose conflicts of interest and
other material facts relating to the advisory relationship. To appreciate
the near absurdity of that result, one need look no further than Capital
Gains Research Bureau. Under the principles articulated in that case, had
CGRB's clients been investment funds, rather than individuals, CGRB
would have owed its obligation to disclose its trading practices and con-
flicts of interest to the fund, rather than any of the investors in the fund.
To be sure, that result may be more appropriate if the fund is under
the control of someone other than the adviser or its affiliates, such as an-
other investment adviser that, for example, might place portions of the
fund's assets with multiple, unaffiliated investment advisers. In those situa-
tions, the investment adviser's disclosure to the "fund" arguably means dis-
closure to the fund's independent adviser or other control person, who
would make decisions based on that disclosure, such as whether to con-
tinue or to terminate the advisory relationship. In the world of hedge
funds and other private funds, however, a prevalent model is for the ad-
viser providing the disclosure also to have control of the fund, either as its
"sponsor"-that is, the person responsible for organizing and operating
the fund-and/or as its general partner or manager.53 In those circum-
stances, the adviser's disclosure obligation is technically an obligation to dis-
close information to itself The persons who have decisionmaking authority-
that is, who can decide whether or not to act on the disclosure-are the
investors. But under the Capital Gains Research Bureau doctrine, the inves-
tors have no right to receive that disclosure; rather, only the fund has that
right.
This anomaly permeates the Advisers Act, which generally speaks in
terms of the obligations an adviser has to its "clients" rather than to the
persons to whom the adviser markets its funds and who ultimately become
investors in those funds. The following discussion sets forth three exam-
ples of the investor protection concerns associated with that result.
1. Advisory Services Termination Penalties
It is common for the terms under which hedge funds offer interests to
investors to specify that investors may withdraw their capital from the fund
(or, for funds with share capitalization structures, redeem their shares)
53. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279)
[hereinafter 2004 Release].
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only periodically-monthly, quarterly, or even annually. It is also com-
mon for investors to be "locked" into the fund for a certain period-per-
haps one to three years-after they invest, during which the investors may
not withdraw any capital or may do so only if they are willing to be subject
to an "early withdrawal fee," which is typically a certain percentage of the
value of the investors' withdrawal proceeds. Those restrictions on with-
drawals mean that investors may be unable to terminate an adviser's man-
agement of their assets for substantial periods, even though they may
desire to do so.54
Additionally, funds' fee terms often specify that the fund pays a "man-
agement fee" (a fee based on the amount of assets in the fund) to the
fund's adviser monthly or quarterly, with the fee for each period charged
and paid at the beginning of the period.5 5 Where a fund pays the fee "in
advance" in this way, the fund's adviser typically will not (and is not re-
quired to) refund to the fund any portion of the fee paid to the adviser as
to capital that investors withdraw mid-period. The result is that, by sub-
jecting withdrawing investors to the management fee based on the amount
of capital invested as of the beginning of the period-even though the
investors may have withdrawn a portion of that capital before period-
end-the adviser is compensated for services that it ultimately will not
provide.
However, if the fund's investors, rather than the fund, were the ad-
viser's "clients," the Advisers Act would preclude these outcomes, as they
would be deemed to violate the Advisers Act's antifraud provisions.56
Turning first to a client's ability to terminate advisory services, the SEC
reasons that an adviser's continuing to provide services to a client should
depend on "the client's having trust and confidence in the adviser and a
willingness to continue the advisory relationship," rather than the client's
inability to terminate the services because of contractual restrictions.5 7 In-
54. See, e.g., Matthew Lynn, Hedge Funds Will Be Ruined by Withdrawal Limits,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 5, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2060
1110&sid=au6xA2tlWSOw (noting that "funds have placed limits on withdrawals
that investors can make" and citing recent examples of "funds limiting
withdrawals").
55. "Management fees" are typically asset-based fees that are calculated, as to
each investor, on the basis of the investor's investment in the fund at the begin-
ning (or end, as to funds paying management fees "in arrears") of the relevant
quarter or month or other period as to which the management fee is to be
calculated.
56. Specifically, the SEC views these practices as violating Section 206(2) of
the Advisers Act, which makes it unlawful for an adviser "to engage in any transac-
tion, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any
client or prospective client." See Robert D. Brown Inv. Counsel, Inc., SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2661, at *2, *4 (July 19, 1984) (citing 15
U.S.C. § 80b-6(2)) (concluding that "a contract for investment supervisory services
purporting to bind a client for a period of one year without a right to terminate
except annually would violate [S]ection 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940").
57. Id. at *3.
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deed, denying a client the ability to terminate the contract when the client
would otherwise do so, from the SEC's perspective, "would be fraudulent
and deceptive because the contract might lead the client to believe that he
is not entitled to terminate the contract when fiduciary principles indicate
that he has that right."5 8 Similarly, the SEC has deemed it fraudulent and
deceptive for an adviser to refuse to refund fees paid by an advisory client
in advance for the period in which the client terminated the adviser's ser-
vices.5 9 That practice, in the SEC's view, would require clients to "pay[ ]
for advisory services which they do not wish to and will not receive," which
also could "inhibit [a client's] decision to terminate the advisory relation-
ship, even though he may wish to seek advisory services elsewhere."60
Because fund investors do not have client status under the Advisers
Act, these antifraud principles do not apply to the contracts pursuant to
which they invest in the fund. Fund investors may be unable to terminate
the adviser's management of their assets when they would like to and may
be required to pay fees for periods during which they had no assets under
the adviser's management. That is not a product of anything relating to
the nature of the services provided, other than that the fund, and not the
investor, is the direct recipient of those services.
2. Client Consent
Under Section 206(3) of the Advisers Act, an adviser may not buy a
security from, or sell a security to, a client without "disclosing to such cli-
ent in writing before the completion of such transaction the capacity in
which [the adviser] is acting and obtaining the consent of the client to
such transaction."6 1 That consent requirement, which applies on a trans-
action-by-transaction basis, 62 follows from the prospect that, in causing a
client to enter into a transaction with the adviser, the adviser has obvious
58. Id. at *4.
59. See Consultant Publ'ns Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 191, at *2-3 (Jan. 29, 1975) ("[A]ny advisory contract which does not pro-
vide in substance for a pro rata refund of a prepaid investment advisory fee would
raise serious questions and could, in our opinion, violate the antifraud provisions
of Section 206 of the Advisory Act.").
60. Churchill Mgmt. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
2422, at *3 (May 30, 1974); see also Nat'l Deferred Compensation, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2453, at *3 (Aug. 31, 1987) ("An adviser
may not fulfill its fiduciary obligations if it imposes a fee structure penalizing a
client for deciding to terminate the adviser's service or if it imposes an additional
fee on a client for choosing to change his investment.") (citation omitted).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (2006).
62. See Opinion of Director of Trading and Exchange Division, Relating to
Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933, and Sections 10(b) and 15(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 40, 1945 WL 26361, at *2 (Feb. 5, 1945)
("[T]he requirements of written disclosure and of consent contained in [Section
206(3)] must be satisfied before the completion of each separate transaction.").
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conflicts of interest.6 3 Although it may seem that advisers should never
engage in such "principal" transactions with their clients, under certain
circumstances those transactions may further client interests.
Among other things, it may be in the interests of multiple funds an
adviser manages for those funds to transact with one another, such as
when, due to the- timing of capital inflows and outflows or for other rea-
sons, one fund has too little of a particular position that another fund has
in excess, in each case as dictated by the funds' respective investment strat-
egies.64 Having one fund buy the security from the other fund may, in
some circumstances, result in lower transaction costs, as compared with
the funds' buying or selling the security in the open market.6 5 However, if
the adviser or its affiliates holds in excess of 25% of the interests of one of
the funds, this type of "cross" transaction is deemed to be a principal trans-
action under Section 206(3), requiring client consent.66 In other circum-
stances, an adviser may be under common control or otherwise affiliated
with a registered broker-dealer with whom, due to pricing or other effi-
ciencies, the adviser wishes the funds it manages to transact. The affilia-
tion between the adviser and the broker-dealer makes those transactions
principal transactions requiring client consent pursuant to Section 206(3).
If, however, the adviser controls and speaks for the client that needs
to provide the consent-for example, a fund that is a party to a cross trans-
action with another fund in which the funds' (common) adviser holds a
substantial ownership interest-the consent requirement is empty. Not
surprisingly, advisers to funds generally realize the impropriety of being
both the party that proposes a principal transaction and the party evaluat-
ing and providing consent to it. Accordingly, one common approach is
for the adviser to appoint a committee of independent investors in the
fund to evaluate and, if deemed appropriate, consent to transactions the
adviser proposes.6 7 Nothing in the Advisers Act or the rules under the
Advisers Act confirms that such an alternative complies with Section
206(3), and advisers using that approach generally do so based on its be-
ing the only viable option-both preferable, from a conflicts perspective,
63. See Interpretation of Section 206(3) of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, Advisers Act Release No. 1732, 17 C.F.R. pt. 276 (July 17, 1998).
64. See Gardner Russo & Gardner, SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 482 (June 7, 2006).
65. See id. at *15 (describing one adviser's belief that clients benefit from cross
transactions due to lower transaction costs and "minimiz[ing] the impact to the
market for those securities").
66. See id. at *8-9 (noting SEC staff's belief that Section 206(3) "would apply
to a cross transaction between a client account and an account of which the invest-
ment adviser and/or a controlling person in the aggregate, own(s) more than
25%" but "would not apply to a cross transaction between a client account and an
account of which the investment adviser and/or its controlling persons, in the
aggregate, own 25% or less") (footnotes omitted).
67. Given more time, advisers could also arrange for a vote of all fund inves-
tors, although the speed at which transactions sometimes must be effected render
that approach unworkable.
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to the advisers' consenting on the funds' behalf and more workable than
obtaining a vote of all of the funds' investors. That the construction of the
Advisers Act and its failure to acknowledge the practical applications of its
antifraud principles requires advisers to create their own extra-statutory
requirements and procedures further highlights the Advisers Act's defi-
ciencies as applied to hedge fund managers.
Section 206(3) is not the only section giving rise to anomalies involv-
ing client consent. The consent of advisory clients is also required by Sec-
tion 205(a). That section requires advisory contracts to specify that the
contract may not be assigned without the consent of the relevant client.68
As with the requirement that an adviser obtain the client's consent to each
principal transaction, the fund-client doctrine produces the result that,
when the adviser is the general partner or managing member of the fund,
consent effectively may be provided by the adviser, in its capacity as the
person who controls the fund. As with the principal transaction require-
ment, in that situation there is no settled or obvious means of complying
with the consent-to-assignment requirement.
3. The "Cash Solicitation Rule"
The rules under the Advisers Act have similar problems. One exam-
ple is Rule 206(4)-3, which prohibits an adviser from paying a cash fee to a
solicitor in connection with client solicitation activities unless the adviser
complies with various requirements. 6 9 That rule does not impose a similar
requirement as to advisers' engagements of solicitors to solicit investors for
funds the advisers manage. Perhaps because the Advisers Act and its rules
generally do not contemplate that advisers may manage private funds-in
addition or as an alternative to managing separate accounts or registered
investment companies-the SEC had, at one time, interpreted the rule to
apply to advisers' solicitation of private fund investors. 70 In 2008, how-
ever, the SEC recanted that interpretation, based in part on the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals' conclusion regarding the meaning of "client" in
Goldstein v. SEC.71
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a) (2006).
69. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-3 (2009).
70. See Dana Inv. Advisors, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 871 (Oct. 12, 1994); Dechert Price & Rhoads, SEC No-Action Letter, 1990
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1291 (Dec. 4, 1990); Stein Roe & Farnham Inc., SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 519 (June 29, 1990).
71. Mayer Brown LLP, SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 515, at
*3 (July 15, 2008) (citing Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006)) [herein-
after Mayer Brown NAL]. As this Article suggests, reliance on Goldstein is not, in at
least some respects, persuasive. For a discussion evaluating the Goldstein court's
analysis, see infra notes 107-21 and accompanying text. Less persuasive still was the
SEC's grounding its new perspective on Rule 206(4)-3 in its assumption that the
SEC naturally would have considered the application of the rule to private funds at
the time it adopted the rule. See Mayer Brown NAL, supra, at *12-13. In particular,
the no-action letter notes that the SEC's releases proposing and adopting the rule
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As a result of that interpretation, advisers that engage solicitors to
seek out investors for the private funds the advisers manage are not re-
quired to, among other things, provide the sorts of disclosures to solicited
persons that they would need to provide if those persons were prospective
clients in separate account arrangements. Those required disclosures in-
clude information about the compensation the adviser is paying the solici-
tor, the nature of the relationship between the solicitor and the adviser,
including the existence of any affiliation, and the amount (if any) of addi-
tional fees the client will bear as a result of the solicitation arrangement.72
In addition, the adviser and the solicitor need not have a written agree-
ment specifying the terms of the engagement and the compensation to be
paid, and the adviser need not seek to ensure that the solicitor has com-
plied with its obligations under the agreement-two other requirements
under Rule 206(4)-3.73 While persons who are clients receive the advan-
tages of those protections, those that merely have the "investor" label do
not.
The examples above are merely that. Other Advisers Act rules like-
wise produce results that similarly subvert common sense and militate
against investor protection: Rule 204-3 requires registered advisers to pro-
vide clients and prospective clients copies of a written disclosure state-
ment, both at the outset of the relationship and, annually thereafter, to
provide or offer to provide those disclosure statements. 74 There is no re-
quirement that those advisers provide disclosure statements to fund inves-
tors. Under Rule 206(4)-4, it is a fraudulent act for an adviser to fail to
disclose to any "client or prospective client" all material facts relating to
the adviser's disciplinary history; the rule does not require advisers to dis-
close that information to investors in funds that they manage.75 And Rule
206(4)-6 specifies that an adviser would engage in a fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative act if it were to vote proxies on behalf of client accounts
without disclosing to clients its proxy voting policies and procedures and
how they may obtain information from the adviser about the proxies it has
voted.7 6 The rule does not include obligations owed to investors in funds
the adviser manages.
did not suggest that the rule applied to payments to compensate solicitors for solic-
iting fund investors and, further, the rule is
designed so as to clearly apply to solicitations and referrals in which the
solicited or referred persons might ultimately enter into investment advi-
sory contracts with the investment adviser, yet investors in investment
pools (as such) do not typically enter into investment advisory contracts
with the investment advisers of the pools.
Id. at *5 (citation omitted).
72. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-3(b).
73. See id. §§ 275.206(4)-3(a) (1) (iii), (2) (iii) (C).
74. See id. § 275.204-3.
75. See id. § 275.206(4)-4.
76. See id. § 275.206(4)-6.
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As elaborated below, that advisers need to direct disclosure and their
fiduciary and other obligations to an entity that they have created and
control is striking in its incongruity with principal-agent and fiduciary the-
ory. It also renders unsurprising the groundswell of support for regula-
tors' and observers' recommendations, in light of the recent financial
market turmoil, that advisers to large investment funds be required to reg-
ister under the Advisers Act. That groundswell was based more on a reac-
tion to current events than an adequate appreciation that the fund-client
doctrine was-and remains-problematic for reasons well beyond its al-
lowing a group of advisers to escape SEC regulation.
B. Agency Costs and Resource Misallocation
Principal-agent theory also suggests that, as between a fund and its
investors, investors are the more appropriate client of the fund's invest-
ment adviser. That argument rests on principles of fiduciary duty theory
and, in particular, the supposition that efficiency is created through an
investment adviser's treating fund investors as clients and, as such, owing
its fiduciary duties to them. More specifically, through an economic lens,
agency cost theory supports this Article's argument that fund investors
should be the clients of the fund's adviser and, concomitantly, the benefi-
ciaries of the adviser's fiduciary obligations.
Agency cost theory provides a useful framework for describing and
informing myriad principal-agent relationships. However, scholarship ad-
dressing the nature of the firm has employed agency cost analysis most
vigorously, elucidating it in the process. The classic explanation for the
firm's existence is that economic activity takes place within firms when the
costs from conducting economic activity in a centralized structure under
common direction are lower than the costs of conducting that activity
through transacting in the open market.7 7 That was Coase's historic in-
sight,78 to which Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means contributed their in-
sight that coordinating economic activity within the firm comes at a price,
which is the costs created by the myriad principal-agent relationships that
the firm comprises.79
Under agency cost theories, organizations are seen as "webs of ex-
press, implied, and metaphorical contracts among individuals with con-
flicting interests," and so agency cost theories "focus on the problems of
shirking and monitoring that stem from information asymmetries within
the organization's component relationships."8 0
77. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNEI.. L.
REv. 621, 634 (2004).
78. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcoNOmIcA 386
(1937).
79. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MODERN COR-
PORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
80. Sitkoff, supra note 77, at 635.
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Using the vocabulary of agency in economic rather than legal
parlance, agency problems are caused by the impossibility of
complete contracting when one party (the agent) has discretion-
ary and unobservable decision-making authority that affects the
wealth of another party (the principal). When the agent's effort
is unobservable, ex post enforcement of the ex ante bargain, no
matter how detailed it may be, is impractical . .. unless there is a
perfect correlation between the agent's effort and the project's
observable profits, in which case a good or bad return would con-
clusively show the level of the agent's effort, it will be difficult for
the principal to prevent shirking by the agent.8 1
Understanding organizational forms under the agency cost theory in-
volves studying the myriad principal-agent relationships that comprise
those forms. 82 Part of the research necessitated by agency costs theories
relates to evaluating what mechanisms might reduce agency costs-the
costs incurred for principals to monitor agents and to mitigate the shirk-
ing that may arise from the fact that agents have information that princi-
pals do not.83
That is where fiduciary duty principles become relevant, as one of the
mechanisms for minimizing those oversight costs.8 4 It is only one possible
mechanism, however. Others include incentive-based compensation struc-
tures and disclosure requirements. 8 5 Because fiduciary duties add addi-
tional costs to any principal-agent relationship, those other mechanisms
may be more appropriate in any particular circumstance than imposing
fiduciary duties.86 That raises the question of what relationships are most
appropriate for imposing of fiduciary duties, given the costs that accom-
pany them.
Under economic theory, default fiduciary duties are most appropriate
in the context of indefinite, unspecified obligations, where the agents' ob-
ligations are to act "with due care" or "prudently" and where the relation-
81. Id. at 636 (footnotes omitted).
82. See id. at 637.
83. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26J.L. & EcoN. 301, 304 (1983) (observing, in organizational context, that
controlling "agency problems in the decision process is important when the deci-
sion managers who initiate and implement important decisions are not the major
residual claimants" and that "effective control procedures" are needed to prevent
managers from acting adversely to residual claimants' interests).
84. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. Lu.. L. REv. 209,
217 ("[F]iduciary duties compensate for the owner's inability directly to observe,
evaluate, and discipline the manager's performance.").
85. See Sitkoff, supra note 77, at 637-38 and accompanying notes.
86. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 84, at 212 ("[I]n many situations where fidu-
ciary duties might seem to have benefits because of one party's vulnerability, the
costs of fiduciary duties outweigh the benefits."). The costs of fiduciary duties are
myriad. Among other things, fiduciary duties may weaken extralegal motivation
for good performance and voluntary cooperation. See id. at 233-35.
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ship is long-term in nature and requires expertise of the agents that the
principals likely do not have.87 In these circumstances, agents often have
broad discretion in pursuing their activities, and asymmetry of informa-
tion between an agent and its principal may be great.8 8 As a result, either
principals are not readily able to detect wrongdoing, or their engaging in
monitoring activities is "prohibitively costly."89 Imposing fiduciary duties
as the liability rules that govern those relationships may be the most cost
effective approach in achieving effective oversight and evaluation of an
agent's activities.90
Agency cost theories have been particularly emphasized in scholar-
ship in the corporate law context, spawning models of contract design,
corporate structure, and policy formulation. Perhaps because agency cost
analysis derives from organizational forms whose "core relationships ...
are generally open-market transactions rather than intra-firm transfers,"9 1
that analysis has provided a particularly useful, and widely accepted, ana-
lytical framework for evaluating the relationships between a firm's share-
holders and managers.92 In that analysis, a firm's directors are the agents,
and its shareholders, who hold the residual economic interest in the firm,
are the principals.9 3 Because of the nature of the relationship between
directors and shareholders and the information asymmetries that imbue
it, fiduciary duties are a primary mechanism for minimizing agency costs
that shareholders would otherwise bear.9 4
87. That default fiduciary duties may be more appropriate in some contexts
as compared with others does not speak to whether contracting parties should be
able to limit or waive default fiduciary duties.
88. See Ribstein, supra note 84, at 217.
89. Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Eco-
nomic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045, 1049 (1991).
90. The liability rule that imposes a fiduciary duty on an agent need not be
the product of any contractual arrangement. Rather, by assuming the role of a
particular type of agent, the law imposes the fiduciary obligation. See Tamar Fran-
kel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv. 795, 825-26 (1983).
91. Sitkoff, supra note 77, at 635.
92. See George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 No-
TRE DAME L. REv. 955, 976-77 (2007) (tracing use of agency cost theories in evalu-
ating manager and shareholder relationships); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Struc-
ture, 3J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 312-13 (1976).
93. Under some interpretations, shareholders may not in all circumstances be
the sole residual interest holders, such as during periods in which the corporation
is nearing insolvency or is insolvent. See, e.g., Laura Lin, Shift ofFiduciary Duty Upon
Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485,
1512 (1993) ("Several courts have held that once the corporation becomes insol-
vent, directors owe a fiduciary duty to creditors."). That corporate law regards the
entity itself as a representative of the holders of the residual interests, whoever they
may be, highlights the malleability of corporate law-and, therefore, also high-
lights the rigidity of the fund-client doctrine.
94. This is not to say that the fiduciary duties to which directors are usually
subject are as robust as those to which other fiduciaries are subject. Among other
things, the standard is generally more stringent for trustees, given that trust benefi-
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That analytic framework not only informs and explains corporate
structural decisions and organization, however. It also lends itself to in-
forming the relationships of fund investment managers to the investors in
the funds they manage. As with shareholders in a firm, fund investors are
entitled to the residual economic interest in the fund. Moreover, a typical
investment advisory relationship has the general characteristics of relation-
ships as to which fiduciary duties may be appropriate mechanisms for re-
ducing agency costs: broad discretion and information asymmetry. More
particularly, the relationship is usually intended to be long-term in nature,
it requires that the investment adviser exercise skill and expertise-and,
indeed, the client's assessment of the adviser's skill and expertise is usually
the predicate to his or her entering into the relationship-and the ad-
viser's activities in carrying out its obligations to the client generally are
not particularly transparent to the client, given the adviser's desire to
avoid disclosing its proprietary strategies or because the client may not
understand or appreciate the basis for any particular investment decisions
the adviser makes. That the nature of the relationship between client and
adviser gave rise to responsibilities that were fiduciary in nature permeated
Capital Gains Research Bureau, the Court emphasizing the "trust and confi-
dence" that clients place with advisers and that, given the status of the
client vis-A-vis and adviser, the adviser is obligated to disclose conflicts that
may impair the advice the adviser gives and the investment decisions it
makes.9 5
When the "client" is a fund controlled by the adviser rather than the
party that is ultimately the beneficiary of the adviser's investment advice,
as fund investors are, the fiduciary analysis loses normative power. Most
obviously, as between a fund and an investor in that fund, it is the investor
whose capital is at risk as the adviser pursues investment activities on the
fund's behalf. It is the investor who decides whether to place assets with
the adviser, even if that placement is in the fund rather than in a sepa-
rately owned and managed account. It is the investor who, in light of the
information he or she has about the fund and its adviser, determines
whether to place additional capital in the fund or whether, instead, to
withdraw that capital and place it in another fund or otherwise with an-
other adviser where it may be used more effectively, generate better re-
turns, or be subject to less risk. In short, it is the investor who needs to be
able to assess how best to allocate his or her resources to further his or her
investment objectives.
Accordingly, the investor also has the primary interest in ensuring
that the adviser pursues its activities in a manner that furthers investors'
ciaries are "locked into the relation," whereas corporate shareholders are generally
free to sell their shares based on their assessment of the corporation's directors.
See Frankel, supra note 90, at 825-26.
95. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 190 (1963). For
further discussion of Capital Gains Research Bureau, see supra notes 46-52 and ac-
companying text.
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collective best interests. In other words, because the investors bear the
agency costs arising from the investment adviser's activities on the fund's
behalf, the investors are concerned with reducing agency costs, whether
through monitoring, incentive-creation, or imposing fiduciary obligations.
Because of the implications of those concerns for efficiency in asset alloca-
tion and capital formation, legal doctrine surrounding the relationship of
advisers to their clients should acknowledge those concerns and seek to
ameliorate them.
C. Inadequacy of Recent and Impending Regulatory Changes
Recognizing that the duties that fund advisers owe to clients under
the Advisers Act generally are owed to the funds rather than to the funds'
investors, the SEC in 2007 adopted a rule under the Advisers Act-Rule
206(4)-8-to clarify that the antifraud provisions of the Advisers Act pro-
hibit hedge fund (and other fund) managers from defrauding fund inves-
tors.9 6 The SEC was prompted to adopt the antifraud rule in the wake of
Goldstein v. SEC, in which the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the
SEC's changes, in 2004, to the rules under the Advisers Act that had re-
quired many hedge fund managers to become registered under that Act
(2004 Amendments).
The 2004 Amendments had provided that, for purposes of determin-
ing whether an adviser to a hedge fund or certain other private funds
could rely on the private adviser exemption to avoid registration under
the Advisers Act, the adviser needs to count each investor in those funds,
rather than each fund, as a separate client.9 7 For all other purposes of the
Advisers Act, however, the meaning of "client" was to remain the same-
that is, for those other purposes, advisers were to regard each fund as a
client. The SEC had adopted this rule not as a first step toward extending
advisers' obligations under the Advisers Act to fund investors (a project for
96. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (2009). The rule prohibits:
any investment adviser to a pooled investment vehicle from making an
untrue statement of a material fact to any investor or prospective investor
in the pooled investment vehicle, or omitting to state a material fact nec-
essary in order to make the statements made to any investor or prospec-
tive investor in the pooled investment vehicle, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.
Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed.
Reg. 44,756, 44,758-59 (Aug. 9, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275) [herein-
after 2007 Release]. It additionally prohibits an investment adviser from engaging
in deceptive or manipulative acts or practices where no "statements" are involved.
See id. at 44,759 (citations omitted). The antifraud rule extends beyond transac-
tions involving the offer or sale of securities, reaching all varieties of statements or
other communications between managers and investors and prospective investors,
regardless of the context. And, in enforcing the antifraud rule (in contrast to
Section 10b-5 actions), the SEC need not prove scienter. See id.
97. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b) (3)-2(a) (stating that, for advisers to "private
funds," "[fWor purposes of [S]ection 203(b)(3) of the [Advisers] Act (15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-3(b) (3)), you must count as clients the shareholders, limited partners, mem-
bers, or beneficiaries . . . of [the] fund").
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which it arguably lacked authority) but, rather, to deprive hedge fund
managers of the ability to rely on the private adviser exemption. The re-
sult was that the 2004 Amendments would (and, until the D.C. Circuit's
decision, did) require most hedge fund managers managing assets exceed-
ing twenty-five million dollars to become registered as investment advisers
with the SEC and, therefore, to come within the SEC's regulatory over-
sight. In evaluating Phillip Goldstein's challenge to the 2004 Amend-
ments and, ultimately, deciding in his favor, the D.C. Circuit opined that
the SEC did not have the authority to interpret the meaning of "client" as
it had.98
The SEC adopted the antifraud rule to prevent a possible interpreta-
tion of Goldstein-namely that, if for all purposes of the Advisers Act, a
private fund adviser's "client" is the fund rather than the fund's investors,
advisers to private funds are under no obligation to avoid defrauding or
misleading investors. Like the 2004 Amendments, then, the rule was not a
product of any attempt to remedy the anomalies of the Advisers Act dis-
cussed above but, instead, was a product of happenstance, a "for-the-avoid-
ance-of-doubt" measure99 to clarify that advisers should not defraud
investors any more than they should defraud funds or other persons or
entities considered clients under the Advisers Act.100
As noted in Part I, Congress is poised to amend the Advisers Act to
further regulate investment advisers to hedge funds and other private
funds. If it does so, the measure would likely be one component of a
comprehensive financial regulatory overhaul undertaken in the aftermath
of the severe market downturn. That downturn, accompanied by worries
that certain large financial institutions might fail and that those failures
could have disastrous effects on economic activity, was blamed, in large
part, on the investment and trading activities of large financial institutions,
including those within the so-called "shadow banking system,"10 1 such as
private investment funds and unregulated affiliates of brokerage firms and
insurance companies.
98. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 883-84 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
99. Prior to the SEC's adoption of the antifraud rule, it was already unlawful
for fund advisers to defraud investors (or prospective investors) in the funds they
managed. SeeAbrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 877-88 (2d Cir. 1977) (find-
ing that investors in hedge fund had stated claim for fraud against fund's general
partner under Section 206 of Advisers Act). Accordingly, even prior to the adop-
tion of the 2007 antifraud rule, antifraud principles conceivably pervaded aspects
of advisers' communications with investors and prospective investors.
100. See 2007 Release, supra note 96, at 44,756 (noting that antifraud rule
prohibits advisers to "pooled investment vehicles" (including hedge fund manag-
ers), whether registered as investment advisers or not, from defrauding fund inves-
tors). Advisers Act Rules 206(1) & (2) prohibit advisers from engaging infraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts with respect to clients. See 17 C.F.R.§§ 275.206(4)-1, 
-2.
101. Mike Konczal, Shadow Banking: What It Is, How it Broke, and How to Fix It,
THE ATimrric, July 13, 2009, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/ 2009/07/shadow-banking-what-it-is-how-it-broke-and-how-to-fix-it/21038/.
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One probable effect of such an amendment, based on the bills pro-
posed so far, 102 will be to require U.S.-based (and some non-U.S.-based)
investment advisers to funds falling within the definition of a "private
fund" to become registered as investment advisers with the SEC. 03 Specif-
ically, the proposals would generally eliminate, as to U.S. hedge fund man-
agers, the private adviser exemption and, therefore, any need to
contemplate whether, for purposes of the fewer-than-fifteen-client require-
ment of that exemption, a hedge fund manager should consider each
fund it manages as a client or, instead, should consider each investor in
each fund as a client. 104 That type of change, without more, would not
affect the fund-client doctrine.
Based on the proposals, however, the amendment would also grant
the SEC authority to define terms used in the Advisers Act-presumably
including the term "client" 0 5 -thereby permitting the SEC to redefine
"client" such that the term would encompass fund investors. Nonetheless,
it is more than conceivable that the SEC, if granted that authority, might
decline to use it to substantially alter the meaning of "client," not only
given the SEC's historical endorsement of the fund-client doctrine and the
102. See supra note 11.
103. Under both the House Bill and the Senate Bill, a "private fund" would be
any issuer that would be an investment company under the Investment Company
Act but for the exclusions from that definition provided by Section 3(c) (1) or
Section 3(c) (7) of the Investment Company Act. See House Bill, supra note 11,
§ 5002; Senate Bill, supra note 11, § 402.
104. Most of the proposed amendments, including those contained in the
House Bill and the Senate Bill, would also grant the SEC authority to require regis-
tered investment advisers to maintain such records and provide such information
to the SEC about the private funds they manage as the SEC deems appropriate. See
House Bill, supra note 11, § 5004; Senate Bill, supra note 11, § 404.
105. See House Bill, supra note 11, § 5008 (providing that SEC may adopt
"rules and regulations defining technical, trade, and other terms used in [the Ad-
visers Act]"); Senate Bill, supra note 11, § 406 (granting same authority). In addi-
tion, the House Bill contains a provision that would permit the SEC to define
terms differently for purposes of different sections of the Advisers Act and ex-
pressly references "client" as a term falling within that authority. See House Bill,
supra note 11, § 5008 ("For the purposes of its rules and regulations, the Commis-
sion may . .. ascribe different meanings to terms (including the term 'client'. . .)
used in different sections of this title as the Commission determines necessary to
effect the purposes of this title."). Although the original version of the Senate Bill,
proposed in November 2009, contained a similar provision, the revised version,
proposed in March 2010, did not. Moreover, the House Bill's provision arguably
would actually limit the SEC's ability to vitiate the fund-client doctrine. Although
the version of the provision originally proposed by Representative Kanjorski con-
tained no limitations on how the SEC may redefine "client," the final version
(which is contained in the House Bill) includes a proviso to the effect that "the
Commission shall not ascribe a meaning to the term 'client' that would include an
investor in a private fund managed by an investment adviser, where such private
fund has entered into an advisory contract with such adviser." Id. With some ex-
ceptions (such as where a fund's general partner is its investment adviser), hedge
funds typically enter into advisory contracts with their advisers. For further discus-
sion of the implications of these relationships for the fund-client doctrine, see infra
notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
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case law deemed to support it,1 0 6 but also because the SEC at that point
would have achieved the goal it was seeking when its rulemaking placed
the definition of "client" in the spotlight in 2004. In other words, that
hedge fund managers may soon need to become registered with the SEC
under the Advisers Act presumably would render less urgent Congress's
and the SEC's reconsideration of the fund-client doctrine.
IV. THE FUND-CLIENT DOCTRINE AS DISTORTED POLICY
In Part II, this Article discussed the settled principle that, for pur-
poses of an adviser's obligations to its clients, investment funds the adviser
manages, rather than investors in those funds, are deemed to be the ad-
viser's clients. In this Part, it argues that the fund-client doctrine is based
on a misunderstanding of both the Advisers Act and the landmark cases
discussed above.
A. Goldstein's Analysis of "Client"
A misunderstanding of the Advisers Act is evident, most recently and
prominently, in the D.C. Circuit's decision in Goldstein. As an initial mat-
ter, in Goldstein's analysis of the Advisers Act, the court, in looking to
whether the SEC's construction of the Advisers Act was reasonable, noted
(quite logically) that the determination of reasonableness "'depends,' in
part, 'on the construction's 'fit' with the statutory language, as well as its
conformity to statutory purposes.'""0 7 However, the court then pro-
ceeded to assume, rather than establish, conclusions about the text of the
Advisers Act.
In particular, in a detour lacking factual predicate, the court perfunc-
torily asserted that "the Commission's interpretation of the word 'client'
comes close to violating the plain language of the statute." 0 8 Not pausing
to cite support for that statement, the court continued, noting that "[a]t
best it is counterintuitive to characterize the investors in a hedge fund as
the 'clients' of the adviser."10 9 Leaving unspecified what, exactly, made
that characterization "counterintuitive," the court went on to observe:
The adviser owes fiduciary duties only to the fund, not to the
fund's investors. Section 206 of the Advisers Act makes it unlaw-
ful for any investment adviser-registered or not-to engage in
any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as
106. See 1997 Release, supra note 29, at 15,102; 1985 Release, supra note 19, at8741 (observing that when "an adviser to an investment pool manages the assets of
the pool on the basis of the investment objectives of participants as a group, it
appears appropriate to view the pool-rather than each participant-as a client of
the adviser"); see also Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
107. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 881 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984,988 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
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a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client. In SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., the Supreme Court held that
this provision created a fiduciary duty of loyalty between an ad-
viser and his client. In that case, the duty of loyalty required an
adviser to disclose self-interested transactions to his clients. The
Commission recognizes more generally that the duty of loyalty
requires advisers to manage their clients' portfolios in the best
interests of clients, and imposes obligations to fully disclose any
material conflicts the adviser has with its clients, to seek best exe-
cution for client transactions, and to have a reasonable basis for
client recommendations. 10
With that, the court repeated the truism that advisers owe duties to their
clients but did not add any insight as to who or what should be considered
clients.
The court sought to bolster its statutory analysis with more pragmatic
considerations, namely that regarding investors as clients inevitably will
produce conflicts: " [i]f the investors are owed a fiduciary duty and the
entity is also owed a fiduciary duty, then the adviser will inevitably face
conflicts of interest"-much as a lawyer or an accountant to a corporation
would also have conflicts of interest if that person were deemed also to
represent the corporation's shareholders. 1 ' Based on that, the court con-
cluded that "[i]t simply cannot be the case that investment advisers are the
servants of two masters in this way""i 2-without considering that, under
the Advisers Act, perhaps only the investors might be considered the ad-
viser's clients.' 1 3 Punctuating that discussion, the court turned to the
SEC's argument against what it saw as the private adviser exemption's exal-
tation of form over substance. In particular, the SEC had contended that
hedge funds' form of organization was "merely 'legal artifice,"' employed
to protect advisers "who want to advise more than fifteen clients and re-
main exempt from registration."'1 4 To this, the court responded that
"form matters in this area of the law because it dictates to whom fiduciary
duties are owed."11 5 However, by failing to provide any analysis of why
form dictates to whom duties are owed, the court essentially concluded
that form matters because it does.
Beyond its analysis of the Advisers Act, the Goldstein court looked to
legislative history of that statute, particularly the Lowe Court's evaluation of
it, as it informed that Court's understanding of the term "client."" 6 The
Goldstein court began by noting that the Lowe Court, in holding that "pub-
110. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. For further discussion of this suggestion, see infra Part V.C.
114. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 882 (internal citations omitted).
115. Id.
116. See id. at 880.
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lishers of certain financial newsletters were not 'investment advisers,"' had
espoused "a similar conception of the adviser-client relationship" as the
one the SEC had recited in adopting Rule 203(b) (3)-1 in 1985.117 In sup-
port of that conclusion, the Goldstein court noted Lowe's statements that
the "existence of an advisory relationship depended largely on the charac-
ter of the advice rendered" and that investment advisers "provide person-
alized advice attuned to a client's concerns."11 8 It then pointed out that
the Lowe Court "thought it significant that the Advisers Act repeatedly re-
ferred to clients, which signified to the Court the kind of fiduciary rela-
tionship the Act was designed to regulate."1 19 On the basis of this, the
Goldstein court asserted: "This type of direct relationship exists between the
adviser and the fund, but not between the adviser and the investors in the
fund. The adviser is concerned with the fund's performance, not with
each investor's financial condition." 120
To be sure, Goldstein professed not to "read too much into" Lowe's
understanding of the Advisers Act's history, given that the Lowe Court's
task was not to interpret "client" but to construe an exception to the defi-
nition of "investment adviser" under the Advisers Act.121 Still, to the ex-
tent the Goldstein court read anything into the Lowe Court's analysis of the
legislative history, its doing so was misguided. The Lowe Court's survey of
the legislative history of the Advisers Act simply permitted that Court to
embrace one of the distinctions evident in that history: that an adviser's
providing advice through impersonal publications not relating to any par-
ticular portfolio or client was different from providing advice as to a partic-
ular portfolio or client.122 But, as discussed in more detail below, that
distinction does not support or otherwise inform the conclusion the Gold-
stein court drew from it, namely that the client of an adviser providing
investment advice as to a particular portfolio is the direct owner of the
portfolio (e.g., a hedge fund) rather than the owner's beneficial owners
(e.g., the hedge fund's investors).
117. Id. (internal citations omitted).
118. Id. (citing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 208 (1985)). The Goldstein court
additionally noted, citing Lowe, that "fiduciary, person-to-person relationships
[are] characteristic of the investment adviser-client relationship." Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
119. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 182, 190-91 (noting that publications at issue did
not "fit within the [Advisers] Act's central purpose because they do not offer indi-
vidualized advice attuned to any specific portfolio or to any client's particular needs"
and that 1930s study by SEC on "investment counsel, investment management,
investment supervisory, and investment advisory services" had stated that Advisers
Act "was intended to exclude any person or organization which was engaged in the
business of furnishing investment analysis, opinion, or advice solely through publi-
cations distributed to a list of subscribers and did not furnish specific advice to any
client with respect to securities") (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
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B. Legislative History of the Advisers Act
The Advisers Act was part of a suite of statutes enacted in the wake of
the Depression to regulate the securities industry, with the intent of
preventing in the future the abuses that were seen to have contributed to
the Depression, protecting investors, and maintaining confidence and in-
tegrity in the markets.123 The provisions of the Advisers Act originated in
a study of "investment counsel" and investment advisory services prepared
by the SEC, at the direction of Congress (the SEC Report).124 The SEC
Report chronicled the history of investment advisory services, noting their
rapid growth from 1929 through 1936 as a result of the "demands of the
investing public, which required supervision of its security investments af-
ter its experience during the depression years."125
As discussed above, the fund-client doctrine is supported by an inter-
pretation of legislative history-such as those in Capital Gains Research Bu-
reau and Lowe-pursuant to which one provides investment advice (and,
therefore, is an investment adviser) when that advice is "personalized" and
direct. That interpretation, however, ignores that, at the time the Advisers
Act was enacted, investment advisers were forming pooled investment enti-
ties so as to manage the assets of numerous clients who had selected a
particular adviser based not on individualized advice but, rather, on the
particular strategy the adviser was known for pursuing. Then, as now, at
least some clients chose advisers for their "secret sauces" rather than to
receive all-encompassing financial advice.12 6 To the extent that Capital
Gains Research Bureau requires advisers to provide relevant disclosure to
"clients," whether the client has placed its assets in a separate account to
be managed by the adviser or in a pooled entity containing other clients'
assets should not matter. In other words, if the adviser owes a duty to
someone whose assets the adviser manages directly (through a separate
account arrangement), why not also to someone whose assets the adviser
manages indirectly (through a pooled structure)? The Advisers Act's legis-
lative history does not answer this question and neither does Capital Gains
Research Bureau.
In the post-Depression years, the pooled entities that, effectively, were
aggregations of clients were fairly clearly distinguishable from investment
funds that were to be the subject of the Investment Company Act-regis-
tered investment companies. The latter, which would be subject to the
encompassing regulation of the Investment Company Act, regulation from
which smaller, privately offered investment funds (such as hedge funds)
123. See 1 THOMAS P. LEMKE, GERALD T. LINs & A. THOMAS SMrrH, REGULATION
OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES 2-1 to 2-8 (2009).
124. See SEC REPORT, supra note 4.
125. Id. at 5.
126. Lowe misunderstood the legislative history in suggesting that persons
were properly considered investment advisers, subject to regulation as such, only if
they provided their clients advice as to all of their assets or investment needs.
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would be expressly exempted, 1 27 were characterized not only by their
availability to the general public but also by the absence of a relationship
between the advisers managing the funds and the funds' investors. 128 This
distinction was pronounced in some of the testimony before Congress, as
advisers criticized what they saw as Congress's failure to understand the
difference between an investment adviser's relationship with its clients,
which would be governed under the Advisers Act, and a publicly offered
investment fund's relationship to its many investors. As a representative of
the Investment Counsel Association of America noted, "the personal confi-
dential relationship existing between the investment counsel and his client
[is] so very different from the commodity of investment trust shares which
investment trusts [are] engaged in selling, that any legislation to regulate
these two different activities should be incorporated in separate acts."1 29
Privately offered funds formed by advisers to aggregate clients were too
different in purpose and origin, in terms of the advisers' relationships with
their investors, to assume that they were merely smaller and more secretive
versions of mutual funds and other registered investment companies.
More specifically, aggregating clients in private funds was, in the un-
derstanding of investment advisers and, presumably, Congress, a mecha-
nism permitting advisers to pursue their investment strategies more
efficiently-to assist clients who, by themselves, could not have placed suf-
ficient assets with an adviser to make the client's engagement of the ad-
viser worthwhile.1 30 The pooled-asset structure served both clients' and
advisers' goals and permitted clients to obtain the services they sought and
127. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c) (1) (2006) (providing exemption from defini-
tion of "investment company" for purposes of Investment Company Act's registra-
tion requirements for funds that do not offer their securities publicly and do not
have more than 100 beneficial owners).
128. See Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 743 (statement of Rudolf P. Berle,
General Counsel, Investment Counsel Association of America) (arguing against
"coupling" of "the proposals for the regulation of investment advisers" with "the
proposals for the regulation of investment companies" in part because of differ-
ences in relationships of each to their clients or investors). As one witness before
Congress noted, investment companies generally have "no personal contact what-
soever" with their investors, whereas a "highly personal relationship is of the very
essence" of investment advisers' roles vis-A-vis their clients. Id.
129. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of
the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong. 92 (1940) (statement of
Dwight Rose, Investment Counsel Association of America); see also Senate Hearings,
supra note 5, at 718 (statement of Charles M. O'Hearn, Vice President & Director,
Clarke, Sinsabaugh & Co., Investment Counsel) ("[W]e believe that the investment
counsel profession is quite distinct from the investment trust business and from
the business of others who give investment advice; therefore we believe that we
should not be lumped with investment trusts or others when regulatory legislation
for them is considered.").
130. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 700, 702 (statement ofJames N.
White, Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Investment Counsel) (describing private funds
that Scudder, Stevens & Clark had formed "to make investment counsel available
to the small investor" and that were "commingled funds of the [firm's] small
clients").
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advisers to lower their costs of managing smaller clients' assets. Courts'
and regulators' overlooking this history and their step-wise misinterpreta-
tion of judicial precedent and perpetuation of the misguided doctrine
based on those misinterpretations produced the fund-client doctrine.
However, aside from those miscues, there is scant foundation for the fund-
client doctrine.
V. THE INVESTOR-CLIENT DOCTRINE
A. Toward a More Coherent Approach
The fund-client doctrine should be abandoned. At the most basic
level, a doctrine that regards investors as clients (an "investor-client doc-
trine," for ease of reference) promotes the internal coherence of the Ad-
visers Act. As discussed above, it is a fund's investors who have the
discretion to place assets with the fund's investment adviser (through in-
vesting in the fund) and to act on disclosure provided by that adviser. The
obligations the Advisers Act prescribes for registered investment advisers
are generally for the benefit of the advisers' "clients." However, under the
Advisers Act, a fund's investors do not have client status. The result is that
myriad provisions of the Advisers Act and the rules under the Advisers Act
that require certain disclosures be made to clients and that otherwise are
intended to further client protection entirely miss what arguably should
be their targets-the investors themselves. Instead, many of advisers' obli-
gations under the Advisers Act, by their terms, require advisers to disclose
pertinent information to entities that the advisers themselves formed and
often control completely.1 3 1
Under the investor-client doctrine, the provisions of the Advisers Act
and the rules under the Advisers Act make sense: the prohibition in Sec-
tion 206(3) of the Advisers Act of transactions between an adviser and its
clients unless the adviser obtains the client's informed consent would re-
quire that the adviser, in order to effect this type of "principal" transaction
with a fund that it manages, obtain the consent of the investors (or of a
group of investors) in that fund. Likewise, Section 205(a)'s requirement
that an advisory contract specify that the adviser may not assign it without
the relevant client's consent would, in the context of an advisory contract
between an adviser and a fund that it manages, require that the investors
131. Of course, even under the fund-client doctrine, investors and the fund's
adviser could agree that the investors will have the rights of "clients" under the
Advisers Act, including the right to receive the disclosures that the adviser is obli-
gated to provide its clients. Cf UNIF. P'SHIp Acr § 22(b) (1914) ("Any partner
shall have the right to a formal account as to partnership affairs .. . [i]f the right
exists under the terms of any agreement . . . ."). However, as between the adviser
and investors, the adviser is more likely to be aware of what those disclosure and
other rights are. Because the adviser would arguably not realize any benefit from
becoming obligated to direct its disclosure and other advisory duties to fund inves-
tors, the adviser would not have any particular incentives to address the point in
discussions with prospective investors.
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in the fund supply their consent to the assignment, perhaps through a
procedure requiring the assent of a majority in interest of those investors.
In addition, in soliciting investors for the funds they manage, advisers
would need to adhere to the conflicts disclosure and other requirements
set forth in Rule 206(4)-3 (the "cash solicitation rule") under the Advisers
Act, and, in supplying written disclosure documents to clients pursuant to
Rule 204-3, the adviser would need to provide those statements to inves-
tors-again, the only persons in a position to act on that disclosure. Simi-
larly, the disclosure obligations under Rules 206(4)-4 (regarding an
adviser's disciplinary history) and 206(4)-6 (regarding an advisor's proxy
voting practices and procedures) would be owed to investors rather than
to the fund in which they have invested and that is controlled by the ad-
viser providing the disclosure.
Supplementing the effect that, under the investor-client doctrine, in-
formation that investment advisers are obligated to provide clients would
be provided to those in the best position to act on it, by regarding inves-
tors as the principals of the adviser acting as agent and the subject of the
adviser's fiduciary obligations, the investor-client doctrine would promote
efficiency in investors' asset allocation decisions. It would also further in-
vestor protection, a particular concern in light of the size of the hedge
fund industry and the assets directed toward it and concerns about adviser
misconduct, which have only become more pronounced in recent years
and particularly in light of adviser misconduct that has been recently and
prominently publicized.132
Despite these ameliorative pragmatic considerations, however, the ar-
gument that private fund investors should be considered clients of the
investment advisers that manage those funds may seem to strike at what
has seemed to be a basic principle of investment adviser-client relation-
ships. In particular, it undermines the notion that one's client is someone
who has directly engaged that person to provide certain specified services.
It also invites the possibility that it could subject investment advisers to
conflicts between the interests of the funds they manage and the investors
in those funds. The remainder of this Part discusses those concerns in
turn.
B. The Meaning of "Client"?
Someone's having the status of client typically involves that person's
entering into a contractual relationship with the professional or other ser-
132. See, e.g., Abha Bhattarai, Back in Court, Ex-Fugitive Is Sent to Prison, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 4, 2008, at C4; Bloomberg News, Chicago Hedge Fund Manager Indicted,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 17, 2009, at B2; Matthew Goldstein & David Henry, Bear Scandal:
A Widening Probe, Bus. WEEK, July 7, 2008, at 22; Danny Hakim, A Hedge Fund Execu-
tive Is Guilty of Securities Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2009, at BI; Zachary Kouwe,
Hedge Fund Manager Who Invested Heavily With Madoff Agrees to Cede Control, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 20, 2009, at B3; Reuters, Arthur Nadel Is Indicted on Charges of Investor
Fraud Totaling $360 Million, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 29, 2009, at B7.
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vice provider of which he or she is a client. Here, accountants, lawyers,
interior decorators, architects, and personal trainers, among other profes-
sionals, come to mind as fitting within this model. So, too, would an in-
vestment adviser typically regard as its client the person with whom it has
entered into an investment advisory agreement and to whom it directs the
investment advisory services it provides under the agreement. The inves-
tor-client doctrine rejects that model and suggests that one can become a
"client" by virtue of buying an interest in a private fund and without enter-
ing into any engagement agreement with the adviser providing (albeit in-
directly) the advisory services to that person. However, as discussed below,
employing the meaning of "client," as traditionally understood, to counter
the investor-client doctrine reads too much into the word.
This Article has shown that one's having the status of a client of an
investment adviser is important not because it defines what type of services
the adviser will provide to that person but rather because it dictates the
duties the adviser will owe to that person in providing them. Those duties
will be fiduciary in nature. But fiduciary duties are myriad, their nature
and extent subject to different interpretations. For example, some observ-
ers maintain that fiduciary duties are "default terms the parties would have
negotiated if they had unlimited resources" for bargaining and others as-
sert that fiduciary duties are principles grounded in the status of the fidu-
ciary obligee vis-A-vis the obligor.13 3 Others assert that the heart of a
fiduciary relationship is affirmative, in the sense that a "fiduciary's obliga-
tion [is] to adopt the principal's goals, objectives, or ends,"134 while others
cast it as negative, as a restraint on discretion and "abuse of power."135
Regardless of the lens through which fiduciary duties are evaluated,
however, the conclusion based on that evaluation is that fiduciary obliga-
tions, whether waivable or not, apply to the relationships between invest-
ment advisers and their clients. Even the propositions that fiduciary duties
are "appropriate only where the owner delegates open-ended power to the
manager" and are "cost-justified only where the owner lacks cheaper meth-
ods of monitoring and controlling her agent"13 6 point to the applicability
of default fiduciary obligations, at least insofar as the client grants discre-
tionary authority to the investment adviser, as is the case with both invest-
ment funds and investors in those funds. After all, it is precisely in the
context of a discretionary investment advisory relationship that an "owner"
hands over to another control over the owner's property and does not
133. See Arthur B. Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation as the Adoption of Ends, 56
Burr. L. REv. 99, 100 (2008).
134. Id. at 103.
135. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 84, at 217 (describing fiduciary duties as "a
particular type of constraint on agents' conduct"); see also Frankel, supra note 90, at
811, 825 (noting that "[t]he extent of the fiduciary duty varies with the degree of
potential abuse of power stemming from the relation" and that "[i]f the entrustor
can protect himself from abuse of power, there is no need for the intervention of
fiduciary law").
136. Ribstein, supra note 84, at 217.
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typically have the adviser's "special knowledge" regarding investment deci-
sions that would otherwise enable the owner to monitor the adviser.
However, taking as a given that the business of providing investment
advice carries with it fiduciary responsibilities (whether or not adviser and
client should be able to contractually modify or waive those responsibili-
ties) has no implications for the argument that investors in a fund, rather
than the fund, should be considered clients of the fund's investment ad-
viser. Any such implications would need to arise from the fact that the
investor-client doctrine changes the relationship between fiduciary and
principal. In particular, under the fund-client doctrine, an adviser's rela-
tionship with its client (the fund) is a product of contract-usually a con-
tract directly between the investment adviser and the fund.' 3 7 The
investor-client doctrine, however, severs the contractual relationship be-
tween adviser and client.
An adviser's not having a contractual relationship with its would-be
client (the investor) raises the question of whether the investors are able
to make the adviser their agent and, beyond that, their fiduciary. A fiduci-
ary, after all, is an agent of the principal it serves. But this question is
readily addressed by the fact that fiduciaries need not have any direct rela-
tionship with the principals they serve. Case in point are corporate direc-
tors, who owe their duties to the corporation on behalf of shareholders in
their capacities as residual claimants, and trustees, who owe their duties to
the trust's beneficiaries, even though the shareholders have no direct con-
tractual relationship with the directors, and the trust beneficiaries need
not have any direct contractual relationship with the trustee.
Fiduciary theory is consistent with the notion that fund investors are,
as between the fund and its investors, more appropriately deemed the cli-
ents of the fund's adviser. Beyond fiduciary theory and analysis, of course,
remains the circumstance that, under the fund-client doctrine, funds are
their advisers' "clients" only because the adviser determined, perhaps
based on efficiency rationale, to aggregate into a single account individu-
als and institutions for whom it might otherwise manage assets on a sepa-
rate account basis, with each such individual and institution having a
separate agreement with the adviser and, therefore, regarded as a cli-
ent.'3 8 A doctrine that regards that distinction as meaningful reflects an
unwarranted elevation of form over substance.
137. In some cases, the fund is organized as a partnership or an LLC and the
investment adviser is also the fund's general partner or managing member, and
the adviser's relationship with and obligations to the fund derive from the partner-
ship agreement or LLC agreement among the adviser (its capacity as general part-
ner or managing member) and investors (in their capacities as limited partners or
members). In those circumstances, the advisory contract is a component of a com-
prehensive agreement that constitutes the client (the fund), to which investors are
also parties merely in their capacities as limited partners or members of the client.
138. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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C. Dueling Clients?
Another question the investor-client doctrine raises is whether it may
lead to conflicts of interest as between a fund an adviser manages and to
the fund's investors. This question, raised by Goldstein, largely rests on the
premise that, under the investor-client doctrine, the adviser would be a
fiduciary both to the fund and to its investors. In the view of the Goldstein
court, that prospect would be a recipe for conflicts:
If the investors are owed a fiduciary duty and the entity is also
owed a fiduciary duty, then the adviser will inevitably face con-
flicts of interest. Consider an investment adviser to a hedge fund
that is about to go bankrupt. His advice to the fund will likely
include any and all measures to remain solvent. His advice to an
investor in the fund, however, would likely be to sell. For the
same reason, we do not ordinarily deem the shareholders in a
corporation the "clients" of the corporation's lawyers or
accountants.13 9
From the perspective of fiduciary theory, however, Goldstein's use of law-
yers and accountants in its analogy is not entirely apt, given the nature of
investment advisory services at the time of and subsequent to the enact-
ment of the Advisers Act. Investment advisers, particularly those manag-
ing funds, often do not provide the type of complete analyses of their
clients' financial needs that, for example, financial planners might. 140
Rather, many investment advisers simply develop and deploy particular in-
vestment strategies. Because of that, they attract clients not through
promising to look after all facets of their clients' financial circumstances
but, rather, through the strategies they pursue and the returns those strat-
egies have generated.
Accordingly, although it would be problematic for a lawyer to regard
both a corporation and its shareholders as his or her client, the same
problem need not arise in the investment advisory context. Rather, in the
investment advisory context, a comparison to corporate directors, again, is
more appropriate: first, although a director owes duties to the corpora-
tion's shareholders, the director also arguably owes duties to the corpora-
139. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
140. The fiduciary task force of the Financial Planning Association has de-
fined a "financial planner" as "generally refer[ing] to providers who undertake the
financial planning process for clients based upon their long-term goals." JoHN P.
MORIARTY AND CURTLAN R. McNEA.v, FPA FIDUCIARY TASK FORCE, RECULATION OF
FINANCIAL PLANNERs DATABASE, APPENDIx Gl: FINAL REPORT ON FINANCIAL PLANNER
STANDARDS OF CoNDucr 7 (2007). The "financial planning process," for its part, is
defined as the "process which typically includes, but is not limited to, these six
elements: establishing and defining the client-planner relationship; gathering cli-
ent data including goals; analyzing and evaluating the client's financial status; de-
veloping and presenting financial planning recommendations and/or alternatives;
implementing the financial planning recommendations; and monitoring the fi-
nancial planning recommendations." Id.
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tion-the corporation being, in essence, a manifestation of the
shareholders, considered collectively. This concept works because the
duty that a director owes to shareholders is a duty predicated on the share-
holders' status as such and not otherwise. Similarly, an investment ad-
viser's duty to the investors in a fund the adviser manages is predicated on
the investors' status as investors and not otherwise.
This is no different from an investment advisory client that is not a
fund investor but that instead has simply placed assets in a custodial ac-
count for the investment adviser to manage (in a separate account ar-
rangement). The investment adviser seeks to achieve good performance
for the account, but to the extent that performance is not good, the ad-
viser has no obligation to advise the client to terminate the advisory con-
tract. Rather, its obligations are to abide by the investment advisory
contract between the adviser and the client and to manage the account
assets in accordance with that agreement-which often requires specified
levels of disclosure of performance, periodic communication, and other
mechanisms to ensure that the client has sufficient information to evalu-
ate whether the arrangement should continue.
Second, in the context not only of hedge funds and other private
funds, but also mutual funds and other registered funds, the investment
adviser to the fund has, in important respects, assumed the role tradition-
ally performed by corporate directors or other forms of management.
That is, a fund's service providers-particularly the investment adviser,
generally the fund's raison d'etre141-have come to assume the fiduciary
role of "management" that, in operating companies, boards of directors
traditionally have assumed. Mutual fund boards of directors provide an
illuminating illustration of the point. In evaluating the extent to which
mutual fund directors should play a role in shareholder derivative litiga-
tion, as in the operating company context, courts have been known to
show deference to independent directors' judgment.142 However, among
the considerable differences between mutual funds and operating compa-
nies are that mutual fund directors arguably have fewer incentives to as-
sume strong fiduciary roles and likely perceive-whether accurately or
not-mutual fund shareholders as more able to evaluate their investments
(in light of the ample information required to be disclosed to them) and
141. See William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and
Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REv. 1401, 1423 (2006) ("[F]unds
almost always owe their very existence to investment advisers, which create the
funds and shepherd them through their formation and incubation.").
142. See id. at 14; Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary
Duties in Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Inves-
tor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1026-31 (2005). As some have noted, there
are persuasive reasons to think that, in fact, shareholders do not evaluate and mon-
itor their mutual fund investments or, to the extent they do so, act on those analy-
ses. See Langevoort, supra, at 1035-36.
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more able to act on that evaluation (in light of mutual funds' lenient li-
quidity terms) as compared with their operating company counterparts.143
In the public fund context, then, an ideology of "consumer sover-
eignty" has plausibly been elevated above one of fiduciary obligation.1"
In light of that, and the fact that a mutual fund (like a hedge fund or
other private fund) has its origins in the particular investment strategy of
the investment adviser that determined to sponsor or create the fund in
the first place, mutual fund directors are showing themselves less as vigi-
lant watchdogs for shareholder interests than as a mutual fund's voice in
the event of blatant misconduct by the fund's investment adviser, to whom
they are otherwise deferential.14 5 After all, even though the adviser typi-
cally does not have a relationship with the fund's investors, the fund, as
with the adviser's strategy, is effectively the adviser's product. If funds'
investment advisers have supplanted the roles of independent directors,
then that bolsters the analogy between the duties owed by a corporation's
directors to both the corporation and its shareholders and the duties owed
by a fund's investment adviser to both the fund and its investors. That
analogy, in turn, bolsters the conclusion, contrary to that of the Goldstein
court, that fiduciary theory does not present undue difficulties for the in-
vestor-client doctrine. 146
Even reaching a different conclusion on that point, however, does not
flout the investor-client doctrine because the obligations investment advis-
ers owe funds, once investors are deemed clients, need not be fiduciary in
nature. Despite an analogy between corporate directors and investment
advisers, an investment adviser's owing its duties to the investors in the
funds it manages, as the investor-client doctrine would have it, at least sug-
143. See id. at 1037-40.
144. Id. at 1019.
145. See id. at 1041-43; see also Birdthistle, supra note 141, at 1451 (arguing
that, in mutual fund context, managerial power theory of executive compensation
has greater relevance than optimal contracting approach, due in part to circum-
stance that "investment advisers are more powerful than [operating company] ex-
ecutives, and mutual fund boards of trustees are weaker than operating company
boards of directors").
146. A related question is whether it is consistent with fiduciary principles for
a fund's investment adviser to, effectively, circumvent the fund and direct its obli-
gations instead toward the fund's beneficial owners. For this question, too, it is
helpful to look to the fiduciary duties owed by directors and trustees. Directors are
fiduciaries to shareholders, but that fact has no bearing on the separate and dis-
tinct legal status of the corporation. See Deborah A. DeMott, The Figure in the Land-
scape: A Comparative Sketch of Directors' Self-Interested Transactions, 62 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 243, 270 n.129 (1999) ("It is .. . not necessary to argue that the corporation
is not a distinct and identifiable entity as a step in an argument that directors'
decisions should be made to further the interests of shareholders.") (internal quo-
tation marks and citation omitted). More importantly, it has no implications for
whether directors' actions in furtherance of their duties to shareholders must also
further the corporation's interests. See id. at 270 ("[T]he corporation's distinct
identity, separate from its shareholders, [does not] entail that directors may exer-
cise discretion to further interests at odds with those of shareholders.").
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gests the Goldstein court's concern that those advisers may be confronted
with conflicts of interest. That is, if the adviser owes fiduciary duties both
to investors and to the fund in which they hold interests, which of the two
constituencies should take precedence in the event a conflict were to arise?
That concern assumes that the duties an adviser owes to the fund
need be of the same kind as, and therefore at risk of competing with,
those that it owes to the investors. An adviser under any circumstances
owes duties to the funds it manages-it cannot be otherwise-even
though those funds are not in a position to act independently of the ad-
viser, whether based on disclosure the adviser provides or otherwise. That
is, the adviser is in control of the funds' investment activities and, as such,
is responsible for the funds' earning profits or suffering losses as a result
of those activities. Whether a fund's profits outweigh its losses in any pe-
riod, or vice versa, directly affects the fund's investors. Indeed, it is the
prospect of, and hope for, profitability that draws investors to investment
funds in the first place.
Assuming, then, that the adviser owes duties of some sort to the fund
in addition to owing duties to the investors, the most robust interpretation
of those duties would be for the adviser to be a fiduciary not only to the
investors but also to the fund itself, encompassing duties of loyalty and
candor and the full panoply of fiduciary obligations. As discussed above,
that arrangement is akin to a corporation's directors' relationships to the
corporation and to the corporation's shareholders: both are fiduciary in
nature, and yet they are not inconsistent with one another because the
directors owe duties to shareholders qua shareholders and not otherwise.
However, given that the fund does not have decisionmaking capacity apart
from that held and exercised by its adviser or its affiliates, there is limited
rationale for requiring a fund's adviser to owe client-type obligations to
the fund itself, to be a fiduciary to the fund. That is, little is gained by the
adviser's regarding the fund itself as a "client" to which it owes the array of
fiduciary obligations.
Rather, the duties the adviser owes to the fund are based on the duty
of care, with the particular standards set forth in the investment advisory
agreement between the adviser and the fund. That the adviser must con-
duct its activities relating to the fund in a manner consistent with a speci-
fied level of care merely reflects not only general principles relating to
service-provider/client relationships but also the basic tenets of tort law. A
service provider, regardless of whether it is a fiduciary, must conduct its
service-providing activities in a certain manner, lest it face a suit for breach
of contract or negligence premised on the service provider's failure to ad-
here to the standard of care specified at the outset of the relationship.
However, the obligation of a service provider, including one that provides
investment advisory services, to act with "due care," however defined, is
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not a fiduciary obligation.147 This recognition that advisers' obligations to
the funds they manage differ from those they owe to the funds' investors
allows the investor-client doctrine to escape the potential for conflicting
fiduciary obligations.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the fund-client doctrine is not supported
by the history behind investment adviser regulation, by fiduciary theory, or
by efficiency considerations. It has postulated that the investor-client doc-
trine, in addition to being consistent with the history of the Advisers Act
and fiduciary theory, better aligns advisers' obligations with investors' in-
terests and, by dissolving anomalies in statutory and regulatory provisions
governing investment advisers, makes more sense from a policy
perspective.
In adopting the Advisers Act, Congress intended for investment advis-
ers to be subject to regulation based on the number of persons (clients)
for whom the adviser managed assets. 148 At that time, however, with some
exceptions, those "persons" were generally thought to be holders of sepa-
rately-managed accounts rather than holders of interests in pooled invest-
ment entities.' 4 9 As discussed above, as private funds' roles in the asset
management sector have grown, large and small "clients" have increas-
ingly placed assets in funds that advisers sponsor, often as a matter of ad-
ministrative convenience for both the investors and the advisers.
In a perhaps unwitting nod to that evolution, commentators on
hedge fund activities have long expressed dismay that investment advisers
to large hedge funds and other private funds are not subject to the same
regulation as similarly sized advisers who do not pool assets in funds. 5 0
147. See Ribstein, supra note 84, at 220 ("[A] duty of care should not be re-
garded as fiduciary in nature."); see also William A. Gregory, The Fiduciary Duty of
Care: A Perversion of Words, 38 AKRON L. Riv. 181, 188-89 (2005) (noting that "[a]
duty of care claim is always a tort action and is always based on negligence" and
"can never be a breach of fiduciary duty"). However, a fiduciary relationship also
imposes a duty of care on the fiduciary. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 89, at
1047 (observing that "fiduciary relationship exposes a beneficiary/principal to two
distinct types of wrongdoing"-malfeasance and nonfeasance-that former is gov-
erned by duty of loyalty whereas the latter is controlled by duty of care); see also
Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REv. 595,
599 (1997).
148. See 2004 Release, supra note 53, at 72,066 ("The intent of Congress in
enacting [S]ection 203(b) (3) appears to have been to create a limited exemption
for advisers whose activities were not national in scope and who provided advice to
only a small number of clients, many of whom are likely to be friends and family
members." (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2006))).
149. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
150. Importantly, this Article's argument that, as between a fund and its inves-
tors, the investors are the appropriate subjects of the adviser's obligations, does not
speak to the broader question of whether default fiduciary obligations are appro-
priate where an adviser's client is sufficiently "sophisticated" in financial matters
(as investors in hedge funds and other private funds are often presumed to be)
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The amendments to the Advisers Act under consideration in Congress
would respond to that dismay but would do so through eliminating the
private adviser exemption rather than through embracing the investor-cli-
ent doctrine. Accordingly, they would perpetuate other, similar incongru-
ities throughout the Advisers Act. Policy based on the investor-client
doctrine likewise would bring large fund managers within the SEC's regu-
latory purview, but, as this Article has argued, it would accomplish substan-
tially more than that.
that he or she should be expected to fend for himself or herself. Exploring that
question-which is part of the still broader question of what degree of regulation
achieves an appropriate balance between investor protection and promoting effi-
cient financial markets and capital formation-is beyond the scope of this Article.
